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CREATIVITY AND OPENNESS 
by James Street Fulton 
The discussion we are beginning deals with some of the ideas most charac- 
teristic of the twentieth century and most peculiar to it. They are frequently 
subtle and, worse, they usually cut across the grain of habitual thought. But 
they are not contrived or  impossibly difficult, because in a curious way we 
share an almost instinctive grasp of what they are about. 
My starting point is a position which I found myself expounding nearly 
twenty-five years ago in criticizing a now forgotten tendency to suppose that 
man's hope lies in the growth and exploitation of "Science." Years of interven- 
ing study and reflection have taught me how much that early position needs 
to be refined, so that a fresh statement, much more than a rehash, is for me 
an imperative. On that project I now embark, fulIy aware of the heavy demand 
to be laid on the careful attention and "openness" of my audience. 
The word "creativity" in the title might be taken to suggest the innovative 
originality of a Plato or Kant in philosophy, a Gaiileo, Newton, or Einstein 
in physics, an Aeschylus, Dante, or  Shakespeare in poetry, a Fra Angelica, 
Rembrandt, El Greco, or Goya in painting, and so on for all the arts and 
architecture. The suggestion is not entirely out of place; but for the purpose 
of the present reflections "creativity" shall be understood primarily in relation 
to all there is, rather than being limited to the human dimension. 
"Openness," on the other hand, relates us to  the dimension of human 
creativity, for human creativity is more akin to  discovery, or even revelation, 
than to invention. Like all existence, human existence participates in a univer- 
sal creative process to which it owes its Being. In our lives, as we call our mode 
of Being, that process wears the guise of freedom. My thesis is that the human 
being is freely creative or creatively free only by virtue of his openness to the 
entrance of truth. 
So baldly stated, the thesis seems an appallingly unexciting commonplace, 
and yet it invites questions as unavoidable as they are fundamental. If our 
freedom reveals to  us our position at a vital node of creative process, it imposes 
on us an inherent responsibility that defines our sense of Being, with its 
intimate feeling for, and premonitory understanding of, our potentialities. 
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Each of us finds himself in a predicament that, though common to all mankind, 
is nevertheless uniquely his predicament. By virtue of the common we are 
mutually intelligible; by virtue of the uniqueness the individual is opaque. 
You cannot live my life, nor I yours. Nobody else can live for me, or learn, 
decide, comport himself for me, or  die for me, except metaphorically of course. 
Each of us must make his own way in the world. To live is to be under way, 
each step needing a next step to avoid a fall. Our Being is in motion-in motion 
-not as a thing moves complete from here to there. We live as motion and 
with emotion, for our Being is generation, genesis, coming-to-be, Be-coming. 
Our Being is a be-ing, a particfilar formative process achieving determinateness 
or "character." But this character is not the stamp of a fixed essence, human 
nature; it imposes a constraint-we cannot jump out of our own skins-and 
yet it remains as plastic as freedom and as open-ended as our conceivable 
possibilities. 
Each moment of life is an endeavor having intrinsic direction toward some 
objective, which it intends, cautiously foresees, and anticipates.' Each moment 
thus presents its specific, large or small emergency, because, if for no other 
reason, it is our emergence, our self-formation for good or ill. Emergence 
reflects an exercise of freedom; we must choose the next step. Repetitive 
though our choices may turn out to be, the emerging moment is always new 
and induplicable. We may seem to do the same thing twice; but the doing is 
never the same, being necessarily a second doing freshly chosen. The decision 
to adopt a policy or pursue a course of action is not the same as the decision 
to persist in it; nothing compels us to carry out a project to the end. We do 
not even have to go on living, unless we steadily renew our determination to  
do so. We should not forget, however, that a burden of choice presupposes a 
field of fresh opportunity. 
Obviously, it is not I that provides the opportunities for my choice. As part 
of the structure of freedom they too come to pass with the emerging moment 
of decision. Possibilities would not be opportunities, were they not presented 
as alternatives for choice. Choice would not be choice without having options 
to confront that do not owe their presence to the choosing. 
We and all "creation" thus come to pass together. Being is intrinsically 
temporal. In the form of character the past imposes constraints on us and our 
world; in the form of opportunity, the future enters our presence and liberates 
us. Thus Time is presence embracing past, present, and future in unity.' Being 
is the time-filled process of concrete emergence. As finite participants in the 
process, we have Being happen to us. Our Being is our lot, our fate and destiny, 
and yet we have a share in its formation. Such is the paradoxical situation to 
which thought must again and again return. 
"Creativity" is thus the secret of Being and Time. It is ultimate in an 
inescapable sense-and mysterious. On the human level, "openness" is the 
finite response to the creative potential. Through openness we become respon- 
sive to broad reaches of genuine opportunities and so become responsible in 
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relation to them. Openness, then, is the condition that a man in his fini- 
tude must provide in order to share responsibly in the shaping of his own 
fate. 
A man is open when he appreciates his true condition and true opportuni- 
ties. This is not a very satisfactory statement. "Appreciates" is just the verb 
of "openness," and "true" begs a number of questions. I shall have more to 
say about a11 this before the end; but right now it may help if we consider 
"unopenness." 
For the unopen man truth lies concealed, and he wanders lost in darkness. 
Falseness shrouds and permeates the world in which he lives, To  that false 
world no one can relate himself responsibly, for the proper relation to  falsity 
is denial, and that means refusal to live in a false world. The worst trouble is 
that the free being is not simply a victim of ineptitude, but in his unopenness 
has responsibility for not perceiving and not appreciating what in a sense is 
nevertheless in his presence. The unopen being is frustrated and unfulfilled; 
with difficulty does he break out of the bonds of his own blindness which he 
has at bottom chosen, being, in Plato's phrase, "a principal accomplice in his 
own ~ap t iv i ty . "~  Thus unopenness is not just a quality or property of a person, 
but a way of life, a more or less willful absorption in some activity diverting 
attention from our principal concern with personal fulfillment. Almost any 
activity will do, from obvious diversions like puzzles and games and busywork 
to business and work and money-making, not to mention research and scholar- 
ship. What scholar indeed has not even once wondered whether his scholarship 
amounts to much more than an agreeable pastime, and then has looked away 
from something inexplicit tugging at his center? Unopenness is partly priva- 
tion, like blindness, and partly coverup, like "stonewalling." 
My language throughout has unmistakably echoed philosophers from whom 
I have learned much. "Creativity" reminds us of Whitehead; "option," of 
William James; "Being" and much else, of Heidegger. No good purpose would 
be served by recounting the particular forms of my indebtedness, which I 
gratefully acknowledge. What matters are the insights on which my discourse 
depends. Insights, I need hardly say, cannot be passed from one to another like 
stones. Those with which I am concerned are more like plants growing from 
seeds native to the soil of individual existence; we may cultivate but not plant 
them. Less metaphorically, to repeat what was said before, we cannot learn 
from one another. Communication at a fundamental level is elicitation. Educa- 
tion is inducement rather than instruction. 
But what inducement will elicit understanding? Perhaps what has helped me 
will also help others; consequently, I shall enlist the aid of two surprisingly 
kindred authors to whom I have myself responded with growing insight into 
what matters: namely, the American William James (1842-1910) and the 
German Martin Heidegger (1889-present). I hope to bring out first what we 
dare not neglect in James and also what he leaves unexamined. In this unexam- 
ined area Heidegger will be found to invite us to dwell. 
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Only within the last fifteen or twenty years have we been able to recognize 
how many basic postures James shares with Heidegger, postures which, for 
lack of anything better, are generally labeled "Existentialist." At the very 
minimum existentialism means that our thinking about reality leads through 
our direct involvement in living actively in the world. Reality, including our 
world, is neither a fixed order nor thing-like. The essential character of the real 
cannot be read off the familiar kinds of particuIar things among which we find 
ourselves, for the course of events, what reaIly happens, includes and thus 
depends on our own free but finite human contribution. Contrary to the 
tradition of metaphysics, Reality, Being, is for neither James nor Heidegger 
a substance or a subject, but a history, a fateful tale unfolding to an unforesee- 
able because indeterminate conclusion. Being free, man lives in radical insecu- 
rity. Theoretical certainty, even if it were attainable, would provide only a 
model of security, not security itself. Our understanding has to be of a different 
order, emerging with the concrete process of being a living human. 
Perhaps what living humanly means can be appreciated more readily by 
listening to some of James's brilliant phrases4 
"The concrete man," James wrote, "has but one interest-to be right." He 
has not much to go on. "Naked he is flung into the world, and between him 
and nature there are no rules of civilized warfare." "In the total game of life 
we stake our persons a11 the while." And now for James's peculiar Pragmatism, 
in this relentless gamble of life, we must go all out, acting "energetically" in 
faith where knowledge fails, in the hope of finding concrete personal fulfillment 
that otherwise would not fall to our lot. "A concrete bit of personal experi- 
ence'' is, as a bare object is not, "a full fact," "of the kind to which all realities 
whatsoever must belong." "That unsharable feeling which each one of us has 
of the pinch of his individual destiny as he privately feels it rolling out on 
fortune's wheel . . . is the one thing that fills up the measure of our concrete 
actuality, and any would-be existent that should lack such a feeling, or its 
analogue, would be a piece of reality only half made up." "However particular 
questions connected with our individual destinies may be answered, it is only 
by acknowledging them as genuine questions, and living in the sphere 
of thought which they open up, that we become profound." There we come 
into "possession of ultimate reality at the only points at which reality is 
given us to guard. Our responsible concern is with our private destiny, 
after all." 
Now this concern with private destiny is not a matter of theory but of 
practice, not of judgment but of commitment. It always involves choice of 
some and elimination of other possibilities. If by our efforts we help to make 
certain possibilities into fact, our freedom becomes manifest as a constituent 
of any reality more than half made up. James thus looked upon an all-out effort 
to win fulfilling individual destiny as an indispensable precondition of its 
possible attainment. 
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Not to make the effort is to become, in James's disparaging term, "anaes- 
thetic," that is, devoid of genuine feeling, compelling concern, courageous 
action. That life cannot win, whether or not another can, for the anaesthetic 
man is already half dead, cravenly afraid to live life. Though nothing is certain, 
the energetic man at least has a chance; but the chance is a risk that he must 
take. He must summon all his powers and leap into the void, relying only on 
the faith that he will land safely somewhere beyond. Without this transcen- 
dence life would for James be meaningless. 
We have thus followed James to a dimension of human existence that defies 
pat matter-of-fact explanation. However far we carry our confirmed knowl- 
edge, he reminds us, we are left "wondering 'Why was there anything but 
nonentity; why just this universal datum and not another.' " James holds this 
"ontological wonder sickness" to be the motive generating all metaphysics. 
Despite that, he actually had little to say about it. He took the Being of the 
world for granted with us in it, and never lived resolutely in the wonder of 
wonders. 
Can we settle for that? I do  not think so. If belief in the possibility of a fact 
makes an indispensable contribution to its realization, then human agency 
choosing freely and persisting staunchly must be involved in the Being of any 
field of action whatsoever. "What shall I do" cannot be divorced from the 
question, "Why is there something rather than nothing; this rather than that?" 
In other words we must rethink the relation of man and universe. And we must 
avoid an alternative toward which James's attitude is often, to say the least, 
ambiguous. I think the human mode of existence is neither so private nor so 
individual as James may allow. H e  sometimes treats our beliefs as psychologi- 
cally derivative from incidental circumstances, as if our choices were psycho- 
logically defined. But the existing world is the world we live in, a meaningful 
world enriched by our concerns, cares, beliefs, efforts, triumphs and tragedies. 
If it includes the so-called "psychological," it includes it as essential to its 
Being anything at all. 
That world exists not just for man, but with each man already in it, before 
anything is for him. The world is not a ready-made thing, but the field of 
possibIe action, which is involved in man's existence and becomes opened to 
him in thought. For us this world is the world of Western Civilization, which 
sustains and is sustained by our individual chosen actions in this epoch of 
history. We live in a computerized world, because we chose the technological 
life. Technology did not make us slaves to the machine. We have machines 
because we chose to serve technology. Our world like any other is full of myth 
and fiction. And yet that is the world we really pass our lives in. Much of that 
world may indeed be a work of the imagination; all the same, the world is not 
on that account merely imaginary. It is the only world there is. There is no 
so-called real world behind it. Behind it is nothing. Our life world alone has 
Being. 
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Being? What do we mean by that? This embarrassing question can no longer 
be escaped. Obviously, a simple answer will not be expected; in fact, so strange 
a question seems to  suggest no answer whatsoever. Maybe Heidegger can aid 
our wavering i n ~ i g h t , ~  for no thinker in recent history has responded so 
devotedly to this question. 
Even more than James, Heidegger felt the terror of freedom and absolute 
responsibility. Unlike James, he did not hope to justify choice by verification 
in the spiritual life analogous to that in natural science; nor did he consider 
a leap of faith an  intelligible project. Truth does not reside in a method of 
verification, but in a form of life. Where James tried to leap with faith into the 
fullness of life, Heidegger hopes for fullness, truth, through allowing the dead 
branches of indifference to  drop away in the hope that light may break into 
the clearing thereby created in our busy confusion. James is not clear, as 
Heidegger is, that Being is not a being, not even the supreme being. Being is 
not a universal or a property of beings as such, not subject o r  object, substance 
or transcendental ego, and not even the ground of beings. 
Does this deluge of negatives leave us anything to say or any way of saying 
it? Must we invent a new language? Can we? Heidegger would reply, in one 
word, "No!" In two words, "No. But-." 
Here two words are better than one. A new language is not needed so much 
as an ear for the old one. Living language is full of almost forgotten reminis- 
cences of the primordial non-theoretical understanding of what it means to Be. 
That existential understanding expressed in language elicits recognition with- 
out describing or explaining anything. The discourse to which our ontological 
wonder sickness gives rise shapes itself on its task; for, as Heidegger says, 
"Words grow on meanings."= Primordial source meanings remain alive in 
language, however surreptitiously. Though thinking be our most proper voca- 
tion, we do not need just one more philosophy, Heidegger's or Fulton's. 
Existentially speaking, thinking is not problem-solving; i t  does not so much as 
try to cure the ontological wonder sickness. On  the contrary, if we hear 
Heidegger correctly, it keeps us painfully feeling it, not seeking solace in some 
palliative that helps forgetfulness-"Take Sominex and sleep." The wonder 
sickness, though without cure, does have an appropriate response, which is t o  
face the question and constantly live in it, for it is the question most worth 
asking. 
All this may sound like subterfuge; but it is more than that. It goes beyond 
Wittgenstein's famous assertion, "What we cannot speak of we must keep 
silent a b ~ u t . " ~  Even Wittgenstein, before writing those words, had spoken at 
length of what he could not speak about. He supposed that some could eventu- 
ally understand his "elucidations" well enough to dismiss his propositions as 
"nonsensical," when they had "used them-as steps-to climb beyond 
them."' Heidegger perhaps is not so different, but bolder. He coaxes us to 
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listen for the hidden message of our language, where is voiced that which fills 
our existence silently in any case. His language is more like the poet's than like 
daily discourse, but more subject than poetry to systematic restraints. 
Now, the "truth" that Heidegger speaks of must be conceived in some 
exceptional way distinguishing it from the truths that we usually seek. Corre- 
spondingly, philosophical reason must be distinguished from reasoning abollr 
things and ideas. Both these great topics, truth and reason, must be addressed, 
but with extreme brevity. 
Probably the quickest approach to our goal is by way of an interesting 
peculiar1t.y of the German language. In German, Vernutlft is the word for 
reason in the sense of the highest capacity of mind, as in Kant's Critique of 
Pure Vernunft. Vertrurlft is related to the verb verrlehmen as, for example, 
At~kutrft (arrival) is related to the verb airkomrnen (Has the train come in 
yet?). What then does vernehrnen mean? It means 'to perceive,' 'to take in,' 
especially by hearing rather than sight; it also means 'to interrogate,' for 
example, a suspect. The word for 'perceive' in philosophical German is regu- 
larly wahrrzehtnen, with a bias toward observation of objects. Significantly, 
Cassell's Dictionary gives 'visibie' for wahrnehtnbar and 'audible' for vernehm- 
bar. The lesson of this philological aside, due to Heidegger, is this: Reason is 
like hearing, which must await the arrival of the message, rather than like 
vision, which shoots out and overtakes a world at a distance. The thinker is 
a listener, intuitive and patient. He must listen even when no sound is to be 
heard; that is, he must keep ready for the advent of truth and open to it. If 
he listens to silence, he  may hear the unheard of. 
Two things stand out. First, truth is to be conceived as a happening, not as 
the value of a proposition or as a relation of representation to fact or as the 
coherence of all judgments in a rational system. We must think of truth in a 
way both strange and curiously familiar. Second, our proper attitude to  truth 
is calm but alert patience, reflective rather than experimental, a posture al- 
lowed to him only who, as Heidegger says, has learned to renounce voluntarily 
his own willfulness. Such a one is a kind of "drop out," who refuses to play 
conventional roles in the "establishment," not out of petulance, but In order 
to live more adequately and, almost in James's sense, more energetically. If 
truth is to  happen to us, we must make room in our lives for it to enter and 
take possession, transforming our Being. Is that not ancient wisdom? 
Even so, it may still seem strange to speak of truth as a happening. Where 
lies the fault? In the existential sense truth is something like a revelation of 
secret powers or, more accurately, the revealedness of such powers when 
exercised. Existential truth is neither theoretical nor propositional, but imme- 
diately pervasive as a form of life. Methods of verification, a la James, are 
irrelevant; what can verify truth but truth? Neither is logical rigor enough, or 
correctness, or coherence, Unfortunately, to speak of revelation smacks too 
8 RICE UNIVERSITY STUDIES 
much of theological commitments. That is why it is perhaps justifiable to say 
that truth is "unconcealment," an indigestible barbarism commonly accepted 
in translating Heidegger's neologism Utzverborgenheit, itself a contrived ren- 
dering of the Greek for truth, al~theia. What matters to us, though, is to 
recognize the existential possibility of having truth happen as a mode of our 
Being. 
Unconcealment is the existential exhibition of our condition, unfolding its 
intrinsic nature. On  the one hand, it involves our allowing it to unfold; on the 
other hand, we cannot make it do so, for it remains persistently opaque. It is 
our destiny, which we are partly responsible for, but which always prevails 
over us, Though not possible without our choosing it, the world we live in is 
always more than we bargained for. Our destiny keeps in hiding, even when 
we do  not cravenly consign it to oblivion. Destiny is the correlate of freedom. 
Man's Being is freedom-and fate. 
Freedom is jeopardy, for we are free to die and so  are pressed by the need 
to live significantly. James called it the need to be right. It drives us to  think 
-and to drink, since we are no less free to try to hide from that need. This 
possibility of obliviousness to the mosx imperious need accompanies each step 
we take as a constant risk and danger. But at this point it will help to recall, 
with Heidegger, two of the poet Hijlderlin's lines: "Yet where danger is, 
grows/Also that which saves."" 
The truth of which we have been speaking can happen to us, because it is 
a mode of Being. It carries its own enlightenment with it; but itself is not 
enlightenment so much as a condition making enlightenment possible. That 
is to say, it is not primarily intellectual or even cognitive, but existential. In 
this connection Heidegger often speaks of a clearing (Lichtung) in the thicket 
(Dickutrg) through which life must break its trail. In this dark wood there are 
no beaten paths, no "rules of civilized warfare," no Platonic forms or eternal 
essences. Sometimes we come upon a clearing into which light enters and 
allows each thing to stand in our presence openly just as it is. 
We cannot compel truth to happen to us; at best we can try to leave an 
opening for it by trying to keep out of the way. Ontological truth is the 
creativity of freedom opening upon itself. When truth happens to us, then we 
hear the world pulsing in us, as it and we and our fellowmen have Being In 
that epoch. We then perceive our fate and destiny. Always our Being is 
temporal and temporary, never a fixed substance with an eternal essence; else 
it would not be truly itself. Our essence, including our world, is an is-ing, a 
free and open-ended continuing activity. The emergency of each emerging 
moment offers inspiration to any being open to it. 
Openness and inspiration are not two but one in the happening of truth. 
Open, we become possessed of Being as it takes possession of us. In all this 
we are interpreting, crudeIy to be sure, Being as creative process. Being is not 
a being, a thing, object, subject, substance, essence, but a happening under way 
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toward an indeterminate and undetermined issue. Just as Plato, in the Sym- 
posium, has Socrates depict man as the bastard offspring of Poverty and 
Plenty, an in ter~m being situated in the interval between the two; so too does 
Heidegger assign the being of man to the uneasy Zwischen, the betwixt and 
between, neither nothing nor quite something, more like a relation than a term, 
rather an effort-toward than a settled achievement, a continual wondering 
wandering. The wandering finds no official guideposts along the paths it opens 
up; it does, if seriously wondering, sometimes find new clearings opening 
before it. From one side, they seem our own invention, the work of imagina- 
tion; from the other side, they seem gifts conferred upon us in our watch- 
ful waiting, for we are not capable of imagining just anything whatever we 
please. 
Man, James thought, faced options to be decided among competing alterna- 
tives, which he called hypotheses, but which might better have been called 
"projects." Dewey, I think more subtly, understood the decision among com- 
peting "preferences" as the formation or creation of a Mew preference. Prefer- 
ences were thus plastic and regenerable. Heidegger, pertinently, sees our 
possibilities as identica1 with our likes and dislikes. He reads in the German 
words for possibility and possible, Moglichkeit and moglich, the meaning of 
the verb mogegert, to like. Our possibilities are our likes, or what appeals to us. 
Our likes liberate and also limit us. The creativity of process generates likes 
by which we become possessed, provided that we leave ourselves open to them. 
The scientific mind must keep open to even unwelcome facts and must devise 
upsetting theories to accommodate them. The moral agent must keep open to 
the personal lives about him in his world and find new solutions to old moral 
dilemmas. The artist must so shape his works as to let truth work in them and 
suffuse feeling with insight. The thinker must inquire and criticize and argue 
in the hope that he too may provide an opening into which truth may enter 
and rule. 
Now at last, we return to a question not yet squarely met. What do we mean 
by Being? What indeed can we mean, and must we mean, if we honestly face 
the paradoxical temporality of Being? Heidegger raised the question in his 
masterwork, Being and Titne, but found himself unequal to its demands, until 
thirty-five years later he could return to the topic in a challenging short essay 
called "Time and Being." 
So much that I have been saying reflects my study of that essay that little 
needs to be added now. What stands out is that Being and Coming-to-Be are 
one. Time has Being and Being takes Time. They Involve one another in an 
identity embracing origination, abiding, and perishing, a concrescence that in 
reIation to man is doom and destiny, a Geschick or dispensation of fate. Now, 
one meaning of Geschick is skill or aptitude, what we are capable of, and that 
is the dispensation of fate, our lot in life. We are reminded of the insight that 
we are what we are capable of, and are capable only of such possibilities as 
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appeal to us. The Event of Being is the emergence of possibilities which take 
possession of us through our freely accepting them into ourselves. 
Man, therefore, is central to the Event of Being, for nothing but man has 
a destiny. Only he is reached by the presence of beings, including the presence 
of what is no  longer present and the presence of the impending crisis that is 
not yet present. The past and the future are in our presence, though neither 
is the present. They grow near in the nearness of intimacy, not on an abstract 
grid of Space-Time. In the current clichi, they are always "relevant." 
The Event of Being in which Time and Being creatively define one another 
for a field of individual beings has an inalterably opaque center, for it withholds 
itself even as it bestows our destiny. Truth, unconcealment, includes that dark 
spot of conceaIment. Metaphysics has traditionally tried to disguise such 
opaqueness by supposing it possible to identify some supreme being or ultimate 
principle that predetermines the indeterminable, a magic feat that would pro- 
vide a fate secure against our freedom. 
The Event of Being, however, necessarily includes the human exercise of 
freedom; otherwise there would not be the "world" which is always "world- 
ing" because we live in it, nor would there be we who are there in the worlding 
world. By our freedom we participate in the Event of Being, but do so finitely. 
Our free decisions and actions let things be by opening up a world in which 
things are presences defining our field of action. Our freedom is bestowed upon 
us as our lot, which is the aptitudes that take us as their own by our making 
them our own. Thus we live our values. We cannot make objects of them; they 
cannot be dismissed as subjective. Our choices are required for the Event of 
Being. 
If we may take so much for granted, then clearly the human being lives 
creatively, not as a god but as a poet. H e  needs what used to be called 
"inspiratlon," if he is to "dwell poetically" in his world of earth, sky, mortals, 
and divinities. That which elicits symbols and metaphors is not of his making. 
As Heidegger sometimes puts the case, language uses the poet and philosopher 
for its utterance; it speaks to them by speaking through them. The Event that 
appropriates us includes our own free decision that takes for our own those 
likes that "inspire" us; but we cannot choose our inspiration, for that overtakes 
us as our fate. 
What I have said hardly makes a beginning; but I shall conclude by briefly 
mentioning two respects in which our guiding insight needs enrichment. 
The first concerns the moral dimension of life, of which so little has been 
explicitly said thus far. We are now at least in a position to appreciate how 
it belongs to the inherent structure of our existence. Openness, we have seen, 
runs counter to the human tendency to shirk the tasks of freedom. If truth 
happens to us, we perceive things freshly and respond to new possibilities. In 
particular, the open man accepts things in their own right and lets them be; 
for exampIe, he lives in, not on, nature. More difficuIt still is to let persons be 
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persons, a feat achieved only by our becoming open to one another in the 
ex~stential mode commonIy and carelessly called "love." Love is the precondi- 
tion of perceiving persons in their tremulous freedom and so as having "dig- 
nity" rather than mere "value." 
Now the final point. The notion of Event of Being contains a serious am- 
biguity. Whereas the opacity of the creative process suggests endless plasticity 
without aim or direction, our instinctive understanding of freedom, on the 
other hand, includes the need to be right as essential to it, which would make 
no sense but for some obscurely felt objective that is not ours to set. Though 
man live poetically in the creative Event, he is finite and reaches after a gift 
of inspiration, a gift and not a mere semblance of one. He must find significant 
opportunities and have "live" options. The  Event that "appropriates" us in- 
cludes our acceptance of opportunities as inspirations. But how significant 
would our act be if the Event is endlessly plastic? 
The need to be right, the care that Heidegger identifies as the core of our 
Being, both these are constant. But how can that be, unless our possibilittes, 
however varied, stand inherently graded with respect to one another? Without 
such gradation of relevance, what would choice have to  go on? Does not the 
same need imply the same inspiration? Must we not reintroduce a touch of 
Platonism and allow at least an ever renewed structure of inspiration and 
appropriation, in no matter how many guises and disguises? Otherwise, what 
would "danger" mean, and what, "rescue"? Unless we acknowledge somehow 
a sameness in the Event of Being, it would amount to the tautology, What 
happens happens, and human history would be no more than "a tale/Told by 
an idiot, full of sound and fury,/Signifying nothing." 
Well, why not? It really is hard to say, except that we cannot stop there, 
but keep on wondering. And so we have worked our way back around to the 
same old question: Why is there anything at all rather than nothing, and why 
are we the way we are? But this is no time to quit asking the question. When 
his arguments came full circle, Socrates would say, "Let us start anew." 
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